

The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander's Study¹

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I. Introduction

In 1970, there were about 4,000 African American lawyers in the United States. Today there are more than 50,000. The great majority of the 50,000 have attended schools that were once nearly all white, and most were the beneficiaries of affirmative action in their admission to law school. American law schools and the American bar can justly feel pride in the achievements of affirmative action: the training of tens of thousands of African American (and Latino, Asian American, and Native American) practitioners, community leaders, judges and law professors; the integration of the American bar; the services that minority attorneys have provided to minority individuals and organizations once largely shunned by white lawyers; the educational benefits that law students of all backgrounds derive from studying in a racially diverse environment.⁶

But not every student admitted through affirmative action realizes his or her ambition to practice law. Of the African American students who entered law school in the fall of 1991, the one year for which we have good data, about 40% either did not graduate or graduated but had not passed a bar exam within two years of graduation. Only 17% of the white students in the 1991 cohort suffered either of these fates.

In *A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools* (“*Systemic Analysis*”), Professor Richard Sander argues that if affirmative action were eliminated in law school

¹ We are grateful to Richard Sander for providing access to his data and for the exchanges of ideas and information by electronic mail and telephone over the past several months. We are also grateful to the authors of the other responses in this issue for sharing their thoughts and drafts. We have benefited greatly from the comments we have received on our drafts and our research from Katherine Barnes, Bart Bingenheimer, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Troy Duster, Cheryl Harris, David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Dan Rubinfeld, Stephen Raudenbush, and Susan K. Serrano. We thank the African American Policy Forum and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights for hosting a conference where many of these ideas were first presented.

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⁶ Professor Lawrence describes these achievements as the “forward-looking purpose” of affirmative action, which involves “preparing students for the work of fighting the disease of racism and creating a better world.” Charles R. Lawrence III, *Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning*, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 765-66 (1997).

admissions, the rate at which African American students fail to graduate and fail to pass the bar would be reduced substantially without any loss in the numbers of African Americans joining the bar.⁷ He acknowledges that fewer African American students would be admitted to law school, but predicts that those who were admitted would do much better because they would be attending schools where their entry credentials matched those of whites. Indeed, Sander thinks they would do so much better that the numbers of African Americans who would not get into law school at all (but who would, if they had, have graduated and passed the bar) would be more than offset by the number of additional African Americans who would graduate and pass the bar (but who would not have if they'd attended the kinds of more competitive schools they attend now). *Systemic Analysis* builds to an astonishing forecast: "that the number of black lawyers produced by American law schools each year and subsequently passing the bar would probably increase if those schools collectively stopped using racial preferences." For the year 2001, in particular, Professor Sander predicts that there would have been 7.9% more new black lawyers entering the bar.

We agree with Sander that the high rate at which African American students fail to graduate and fail to pass the bar is alarming.⁸ Indeed, we take the problem so seriously that despite the high value we place on racial diversity within law schools, the four of us would not support affirmative action as currently practiced in law school admissions if we believed that employing race-neutral admissions criteria would in fact lead to a net increase in the number of African Americans passing the bar.⁹ We find, however, that while Sander has appropriately forced us and many others to take a hard look at the actual workings of affirmative action, he has in the end significantly overestimated both the costs of affirmative action and the benefits of ending it. The conclusions in *Systemic Analysis* rest on a series of statistical errors, oversights, and implausible assumptions. It is these empirical shortcomings that we address in this article.

The next section of the essay deals step by step with the process of becoming a lawyer, from application, admission and enrollment in law school through graduation and sitting for the bar exam. At each stage we explain why the findings and claims in *Systemic Analysis* are not well supported by the data. We conclude that if affirmative action ended tomorrow, there would be a substantial net decline in the number of African Americans entering the bar, not the 7.9% increase that Sander forecasts. We cannot say precisely how severe this decline would be, but our best estimate is that it would be in the range of 30 to 40 percent.

In the final section, we shift to a related question: without affirmative action, how would African Americans be distributed across the range of American law schools? Sander acknowledges that the numbers of African Americans at the dozen or so most elite schools

⁷ Richard H. Sander, *A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools*, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 367 (2004).

⁸ We have been deeply concerned about African American drop out and bar failure rates long before publication of Sander's article and two of us had written on this issue before they knew of Sander's work. See David Chambers, *Who Gets In? The Quest for Diversity After Grutter*, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 569, 569-76 (2004); Timothy Clydesdale, *A Forked River Runs Through the Law School: Toward Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage*, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 711 (2004).

⁹ Like Professor Sander, we would still likely support the degree of affirmative action needed to ensure there was not a virtual absence of African American students at any law school.

would be reduced by at least three fourths, but expects that most other schools would have as many African American students as they have today. We disagree. We believe that that the numbers of African Americans would decline substantially at the great majority of the nation's fifty to eighty most selective law schools and expect that this decline would be followed in turn by a decline in the number of African Americans holding the sorts of leadership positions that graduates of these schools hold today.

As we begin, we want to emphasize the limited scope of our response. First, Professor Sander confines his analysis to African Americans, and we have done the same. His findings and ours might be quite different for Latinos, Native Americans and other groups that have benefited from affirmative action. Second, Professor Sander addresses aspects of the system of affirmative action than we do not examine here. We focus solely on the likely consequences of ending affirmative action because we agree with Sander that it is a "central question."¹⁰ Indeed, it is almost certainly *the* central question of interest to policymakers and the public raised by his article. We want to make clear, however, that our silence on other aspects such as the evidence before the Court in *Grutter* on the admissions policies of the University of Michigan Law School¹¹ or his analysis of the job market for African American graduates¹² should not be interpreted as tacit agreement with Professor Sander's claims. If we had more space and time, we would dispute aspects of these claims as well.

A final limit on our scope is that even the limited aspects of *Systematic Analysis* that we do address raise more issues than we have had space for. Within the pages here, we attempt to provide the information required to support our criticisms, but the issues are quite complicated, and so for those readers who desire a more detailed analysis, we have created a longer version on the web.¹³ It is on the web also that we will respond to the counterclaims that Professor Sander makes in this issue.

II. The Effects of Ending Affirmative Action on the Production of African American Attorneys

A. The Effects on Law School Applications, Admissions, and Matriculation.

Part VIII of *Systemic Analysis* estimates the impact on African American enrollments to law school if affirmative action were ended tomorrow.¹⁴ The estimate is built of the following steps: (1) an assumption that there would be no decline in African American

¹⁰ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note ___, at 468.

¹¹ For a response to claims much like those Sander makes about the University of Michigan Law School's admission system see the expert testimony of Stephen Raudenbush which was offered in *Grutter*. [ADD CITE TO TESTIMONY.]

¹² See responses by David Wilkins and Michele Landis Dauber in this issue. Sander's discussion of law graduate earnings in the second year after law school rests on his analysis of data from After the J.D. Study, in which he has participated. *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note ___, at 456-62. His partners in the study have done their own analysis of the same data and believe that Sander significantly overstates what the data show. (Statement of Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant Garth, Bob Nelson, Joyce Sterling and Gita Wilder, sent to us, February 2005). We will add this statement to the website where our response is posted. *Infra* note ___.

¹³ <http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/research>

¹⁴ Sander, *A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note ___, at 470-75.

applications to law school; (2) an estimate that there would be only a 14% decline in the numbers of African American applicants who would be admitted to at least one school; (3) an assumption that among those admitted, African Americans would maintain current matriculation rates (i.e., that “cascading” to lower schools would not reduce the rate at which admitted African Americans chose to enroll in law school); and hence, (4) a forecast that there would be only a 14% decline in the total number of African Americans matriculating in American law schools. We believe each of these assumptions and predictions is unsound and that all of them err in the direction of overestimating the probable levels of matriculation by African Americans.

Sander rests his conclusion that ending affirmative action will produce only a 14% decline in African American matriculation to law school on the research of Linda Wightman, who directed the Bar Passage Study for the Law School Admission Council (LSAC).¹⁵ Using what she referred to as the “grid” method, which applies white admission rates to African Americans with the similar LSAT scores and similar undergraduate gradepoint averages (UGPA), Wightman concluded that, in 2001, if race neutral criteria had been applied, 14% of the African American students who received at least one offer of admission would not have received any offers of admission, even if they had applied to a wide range of schools to which they never actually applied.¹⁶ Sander accepts Wightman’s 14% figure as a realistic estimate of the probable decline in African American admissions. For two different sets of reasons, the actual decline in matriculation by African American students would be much greater.

1. *Sander’s Projections Are Based on 2001 Data, Which Does Not Reflect Current Trends*

Sander bases his predictions on data from the year 2001, which was the most recent year available to Wightman when she wrote her article. While Sander treats 2001 as representative of what would happen if affirmative action ended at law schools today,¹⁷ no single year can serve that function and 2001 turns out to have been one in a group of adjacent years when white and overall application levels to law school were comparatively low.

¹⁵ Linda F. Wightman, *The Consequences of Race-Blindness: Revisiting Prediction Models With Current Law School Data*, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 232-34 (2003). Wightman placed all applicants for law school onto a grid arranged by ranges of LSAT scores and ranges of undergraduate gradepoint averages (UGPA). For each box in the grid she calculated the percentage of whites who were admitted to at least one law school and applied that percentage to the numbers of African Americans in the same box.

¹⁶ Sander describes Wightman’s approach in detail in his article. *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 470-71. By using the grid, Wightman’s grid model indirectly takes into account the factors other than grades and LSAT scores that affect admissions decisions. Wightman also employed a second, logistic regression approach to determine what proportion of African American students could still get into the very law schools to which they actually applied. Using this approach, she found that in 2001 there would have been a 38% decline in African Americans receiving admission offers. Wightman, *Consequences of Race-Blindness*, *supra* note __ at 243 tbl.7. Sander dismisses this second approach as “nonsensical” for estimating the effects of ending affirmative action because he believes that if affirmative action ended, African Americans would no longer apply only to the schools that they did in the past. Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 471 n.275. This objection assumes that even the “safety” schools these students applied to were more selective than the schools that would attract these applicants today.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 474-78; *see also* Richard H. Sander, *House of Cards for Black Law Students*, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004.

In Table 1, we provide for each year from 1991 through 2004 grid model estimates based on exactly the same procedure that Wightman used for 2001. The table reveals that the projected size of the decline in African American admissions in any given year is strongly tied to the size of the overall applicant pool. It is particularly tied to the volume of applicants with high LSATs and UGPAs.¹⁸ In the years 1997-2001, the years of the booming “dot com” economy, young white college graduates in much larger than usual numbers took jobs rather than applying to graduate schools. While African American applications to law school grew slightly during this period, total applications to law schools declined from a high of 99,000 in 1991 to a low of 72,000 in 1998. By 2001, they had risen slightly to 77,000, and, by 2004, they had returned to the levels of 1991.

Table 1: “Grid Model” Estimates for Effects on African American Law School Enrollment from Eliminating Affirmative Action, 1991-2004¹⁹

Year	Size of the Overall Applicant Pool	# African Americans Actually Offered Admission at ABA Law Schools	Projected # African Americans Admitted to some ABA law school without Affirmative Action	Percentage Change in African Americans’ Admission Offers
1991	99,327	3,435	1,631	-52.5%
1992	97,719	Will send	Will fill in	
1993	91,892	3,500	1,891	-46.0%
1994	89,633	3,884	2,305	-40.1%
1995	84,305	3,750	2,554	-31.9%
1996	76,687	3,583	3,105	-13.3%
1997	72,340	3,535	3,212	-9.1%
1998	71,726	3,790	3,388	-10.6%
1999	74,380	3,743	3,379	-9.7%
2000	74,550	3,649	3,206	-12.1%
2001	77,235	3,706	3,182	-14.1%
2002	90,853	3,706	2,998	-19.1%
2003	99,504	3,565	2,705	-24.1%
2004	100,604	3,664	2,472	-32.5%

Source: Law School Admission Council, National Decision Profiles, 1992-2004; Wightman 2003

In 2004, as Table 1 displays, we estimate that ending affirmative action would have cut by about 32.5% the numbers of African Americans who would have been admitted to

¹⁸ For example, in 2001, 1,923 black applicants were admitted to law school with LSATs between 140 and 149. Without affirmative action, the grid model suggests that about 1,552 of the 1,923 (80.7%) could still have secured admission to some law school. In 2004, 1,625 black applicants with 140-149 LSATs were admitted to law school, but the grid model predicts that only 837 (51.5%) would have been admitted without affirmative action. What happened between 2001 and 2004 was a huge increase in the numbers of applicants to law school with LSATs above 149. In 2004, there were 13,344 more white and African American applicants with LSATs above 149 than there had been in 2001, but the ratio was about 20 whites for every African American.

¹⁹ Data for 2001 and 1991 from Sander, *A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note __, at 472 tbl. 8.1 (citing Wightman, *Consequences of Race-Blindness*, *supra* note __ at 243 tbl.7). Data for 1992-2000 and 2002-2004 are our grid model calculations for all applicants reporting LSAT and UGPA, based upon Law School Admission Council, National Decision Profiles, 1992-2004. Wightman’s estimates for 1991 and 2001 are from slightly smaller samples than our grid model estimates, and all the grid model estimates exclude applicants without LSATs and UGPAs, so the figures are not exactly comparable to overall LSAC or ABA data on matriculants, *contra* Sander’s Table 8.2. 2004 data became available in late December 2004 upon request from LSAC, after *Systemic Analysis* article was in press.

any accredited law school, even assuming that they knew of and applied to the school most likely to admit them. Because of improvements in African American entry credentials over the years and a small increase in the number of law schools, the projected decline for 2004 is smaller than the projection had been in 1991 when total applications were about the same, but 32.5% is still an enormous reduction, much higher than the estimate of 14% for 2001. Viewing the entire pattern from 1991 through 2004 suggests that the impact of ending affirmative action on potential African American admissions to law school would probably vary widely across years, but that in most years the negative impact would be substantially greater than it would have been in 2001.²⁰ Indeed, the numbers lost would be so great, that even if every other estimate in *Systemic Analysis* about improved rates of graduation and bar passage proved true (and we explain later why they would not), there would have been a net loss in 2004 of about 21% in the number of African American lawyers produced under Sander's model, and from early indications, nearly the same loss in 2005 as well.²¹

2. *Sander Overestimates the Numbers of African Americans Who Would Apply to Law School, or Get into the Law School to Which They Would Apply, or Choose to Enroll*

The grid model is useful solely for suggesting how many African Americans might have gotten into some law school someplace without affirmative action, *if* they had chosen to apply to the school that would admit them. It offers an upper bound estimate of the numbers of African American who could enter law school by race-neutral criteria.²² Wightman, from whom Sander borrowed his grid approach, made clear that the grid model cannot tell us whether African American students would actually apply to significantly lower-ranked law schools to which they never applied in real life and she cautioned against the very use Sander makes of it.²³ Nor can the grid model tell us whether African Americans, even if their law school aspirations were not dampened by the diminished prestige of the schools they might attend, would successfully identify and apply to the schools that would admit them. In short, the grid model cannot provide even a loose estimate of how many African Americans would in fact matriculate in law school, but Sander, though recognizing that the model cannot tell us what African Americans would actually do, in the end treats it as if it did. We no more than Sander can state precisely how many African Americans would enter law school in a world without affirmative action, but we can offer reasons, supported by

²⁰ Further reason to be cautious about relying on 2001 data is that the years 1997 - 2001 were also the years just after the *Hopwood* decision in the Fifth Circuit and Proposition 209 in California. It appears that during these years, many schools were being more cautious about affirmative action. See William C. Kidder, *Silence, Segregation, and Student Activism at Boalt Hall*, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1180 fig.2 (2003) (book review). With the *Grutter* decision, the legal uncertainty of affirmative action at least at the federal level has been removed.

²¹ The numbers of persons taking the LSAT have proven a good proxy for application trends, and in 2004, the June, October, and December LSATs combined (people applying for 2005 entry) had 1% fewer testers than those same three LSAT administrations in 2003, but still 37% more than 2000 (2001 applicants). LSAC, Tests Administered (2004), available at <http://www.lsacnet.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/data/applicant-data.htm>.

²² The grid has other limitations. Among them are that the results of the grid model turn in part on the number and size of the boxes on the grid. In the grid Wightman (and Sander) used, for example, each box includes a range of 0.25 of a grade point in undergraduate grades and a range of 5 LSAT points. These large boxes (each has a range of 75 points on Sander's 1000 point index) almost certainly lead to a slight overestimation of the number of African American applicants who would be admitted, given the probable black-white distribution of index scores within any given box.

²³ Linda F. Wightman, *The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions*, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18, 22-23 (1997).

evidence and common sense, why the number Sander gives us is a substantial overestimate.

First, Sander incorrectly believes that, if affirmative action were ended, African Americans who now apply to law school would continue to choose law over other career opportunities. He acknowledges that an African American college student “attracted to the law but not desperate to have a legal career might have second thoughts if she faced the prospect of attending a fortieth-ranked school instead of one ranked fourteenth.”²⁴ He nonetheless guesses that there would be no decline in law school applications because African Americans will learn of his findings and recognize that they will, in general, have a better chance of getting into the bar by going to the fortieth ranked school.²⁵ Our own belief is that many of the African Americans who now secure admission to the 14th ranked school could, in the absence of affirmative action, expect admission only to the 60th or 80th ranked school,²⁶ and that, whether it would be the 40th or the 80th, many African Americans will turn to other careers.

Even today, for many African American students applying to law school, other career paths are likely to be nearly as attractive as law.²⁷ A large proportion of applicants to law school (of all backgrounds) are tentative in their commitment to law school, much more tentative than, say, applicants to medical school.²⁸ Among the respondents to the Bar Passage Study, for example, 54% of African Americans and 52% of whites said that they had considered applying to other graduate and professional programs than law within the preceding two years. A less robust commitment to applying to law school among African Americans is also evident in that black students apply later in the admissions cycle compared to whites, apply to fewer schools on average than whites (4.2 versus 4.7 in 1999-2003), and take the LSAT later in the admissions cycle.²⁹ For some African Americans, the ending of affirmative action would probably be the “tipping point” away from law school and in favor of other career paths.³⁰

Even those African American students who could still get into one of the most selective law schools may find attending law school less attractive than they do today. By Sander’s own estimates, without affirmative action African Americans would constitute only

²⁴ Sander, *A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 476.

²⁵ *Id.* at 476-77.

²⁶ See *infra*, Section III.

²⁷ The consequences of ending affirmative action in law school, but not in other graduate and professional schools, are difficult to test empirically. In our web version, we discuss the possible especially severe effects on law schools if they were the only educational institutions prohibited from employing affirmative action.

²⁸ The average medical-school candidate invests several years of effort into pre-med courses and consequently applies to a dozen schools. Barbara Barzansky & Sylvia I. Etzel, *Educational Programs in U.S. Medical Schools, 2002-2003*, 290 J. AM. MEDICAL ASS’N 1190, 1192 tbl.2 (2003). By contrast, the average law school applicant applies to only about 5 schools. See *National Applicant Trends*, LSAC REPORT Dec 2003-Jan. 2004, at 1 (between 1991 and 2003 law school applications per applicant ranged from 4.8 to 5.3).

²⁹ LSAC, *National Applicant Trends* (Jan. 2004); LSAC, *Distribution of Number of Applications Per Student* (2004); Expert Report of Jay Rosner in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, reprinted at 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 377, 385 (2001). These factors suggest the Grid model underestimates the impact of ending affirmative action.

³⁰ The figures above on applications in recent years reveal how widely applications swing in response to mild changes in the economy. And as Sander himself notes, “My own unpublished research suggests that a talented young person of any race growing up in a low-to-modest socioeconomic environment has a better chance of reaching the upper-middle class through ordinary capitalism than through a graduate degree, like law school.” Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 425 n.165.

about 1 or 2% of the student body at the most elite law schools.³¹ Today, the top thirty law schools in *U.S. News* have student bodies that are, on average, 8.1% African American (excluding the three schools where affirmative action was prohibited).³² Many African American students care about attending a law school that has other minority students. On the Bar Passage Study survey, 68% of African American students at the two most elite tiers of schools said that the numbers of minority students at the school they were attending was a very important or somewhat important reason for applying.³³ We thus fear that some African American students who could still get into an elite law school will choose not to apply at all, rather than be a part of a tiny minority.³⁴

Second, Professor Sander assumes that so long as an African American considering law school could get into law school, no matter where, she will apply to that law school regardless of where it is in the United States. Although large numbers of law students, including African American students, travel substantial distances from home to attend the nation's most selective law schools, most students who attend lower tier schools live in the same or an adjacent state.

The question that Sander's imagined future poses is whether African American students now traveling afar to attend elite schools would be willing to travel similar distances to attend lower tier schools. Sander believes the question is of minimal significance because there are plenty of lower tier law schools in the states where most African Americans already live.³⁵ While it is true that lower-tier law schools are located throughout the country, we are quite uncertain exactly what admissions landscape African Americans now at higher tier law schools would face in a world without affirmative action. It is important to remember that if affirmative action ended, African Americans who applied to a nearby lower-tier school with credentials within the range that might secure admission will not necessarily be accepted. If race is irrelevant to admissions, the lower their credentials are within the pool of admissible applicants, the more they will have to offer other strong qualities apart from race to secure admission.

African Americans who are not admitted to the nearby lower-tier schools will have to turn elsewhere and a disproportionate number of the lower tier schools that might have

³¹ Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 483.

³² AM. BAR ASS'N & LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 2003 EDITION 26-35 (2002). Boalt Hall, UCLA, and the University of Texas are excluded. If included, the top 30 schools had 7.4 percent African American students.

³³ 28 percent said it was "very important," 40 percent said it was "somewhat important." The percentage was much the same at other tiers of law schools. At the historically black schools, the proportion who said the number of minorities at the school was "very important" to their choice was much higher.

³⁴ Our data indicate a significant relative decline in black law school applications to Boalt Hall, UCLA, UC Davis, UC Hastings, University of Texas, University of Houston, and University of Washington in the late 1990s, immediately following affirmative action bans. Detailed 1996-98 data from Boalt also show a 25% drop in black applicants with 160+ LSAT scores. At the undergraduate level in California and Texas, applicant and yield rate data is more ambiguous. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, *Would the Elimination of Affirmative Action Affect Highly Qualified Minority Applicants? Evidence from California and Texas* 25 (March 2004), NBER Working Paper 10366; *but see* Mark C. Long, *College Applications and the Effect of Affirmative Action*, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 319 (2004); Saul Geiser & Kyra Caspary, "No Show" Study: College Destinations of UC Applicants Who Do Not Enroll at UC, 1997-2002 (Aug. 2003).

³⁵ Cite his response to us on his website.

space for them are located in states in the Great Plains, Rocky Mountains, Southwest, Pacific Northwest, and rural New England, where few African Americans go to law school today³⁶ and where African Americans from other parts of the country may be reluctant to move, especially if the schools in these other locations primarily place their graduates in locations where African Americans are unlikely to want to live and practice.

Third, Sander acknowledges that the availability of financial aid can affect decisions about attending law school, but points to the “After the JD” study to show that African American students receive about three times as much in “grants and aid” from law schools as students of other races, and concludes that financial considerations will not reduce post-affirmative action law school enrollment estimates.³⁷ His forecast is doubtful. If African American students currently receive grants in part through race-conscious programs not solely related to need, these programs are likely to end with the end of affirmative action. If the reason they receive more grants is because they have greater need, then that need will continue even if affirmative action is ended.

Today, even with extensive scholarships, more African Americans than whites borrow to attend law school (95% versus 84%) and those who borrow borrow as much on average as white students.³⁸ Thus, in deciding whether to attend a fourth tier law school, an African American student who could attend a more elite school today is likely to be affected by their estimate of the size their educational debt will be in relation to the earnings they can expect to receive – and the earnings of graduates of lower-tier schools are in general much lower than the earnings of the graduates of the elite schools.³⁹ Sander argues that these status-associated differences would be more than made up for by the better grades the student would receive at the lower tier school, because grades are more important than prestige in predicting earnings. We strongly doubt his conclusions in this regard, especially as they apply to African Americans attending elite law schools.⁴⁰ As Professor Wilkins points out in this issue, law school prestige is a much more conspicuous long-range signal in the

³⁶ See *Ranking the Nation's Law Schools According to Percentage of Black Students*, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 2001, at 86-87 (there were 52 law schools where African Americans were 4.0% or less of the student body, mostly middle-to-lower ranked schools in states or areas with small black populations, such as Maine (0.8%), Nebraska (1.9%), Oregon (2.2%), and New Mexico (3.5%)).

³⁷ Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 477.

³⁸ See RONIT DINOVTZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 44 tbl.5.2, 75 tbl.10.3, available at <http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/NewPublications/AJD.pdf>. Within the BPS, using rough measures of income, parental education, and parental occupational status, Wightman found that 50.7% of African American law students came from lower-middle class backgrounds, compared to only 22.3% of whites. Wightman, *Threat to Diversity*, *supra* note __, at 42 n.99 tbl.n7, 43 tbl.9. She cites this finding as one reason among many that the grid model is unrealistic. *Id.* at 23-25.

³⁹ The “After the JD” dataset, though not yet available to the public (including us), provides useful information on debt in relation to earnings in a preliminary report. Dividing law schools into five tiers, it found unsurprisingly, that the median income of recent graduates rises with each tier of law school in the prestige hierarchy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, it also found that debts among those who had borrowed were almost constant across tiers. Most people do not realize that many schools in the lower tiers are as expensive to attend as schools at the top. Thus between graduates of the first and fourth tier schools, there was a difference of more than 2 to 1 in median second-year earnings (\$135,000 versus \$60,000) but very little difference in median educational debt (\$80,000 versus \$75,000). RONIT DINOVTZER ET AL., *supra* n. 42, at 73, tbl.10.1.

⁴⁰ Richard O. Lempert, et al., *Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through the Law School*, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 447-53 (2000); DAVID WILKINS ET AL., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: REPORT ON THE STATE OF BLACK ALUMNI, 1969-2000, at 42 tbls. 14 -17 (2002).

labor market than grades.⁴¹

We have suggested several reasons why, if affirmative action were ended, fewer African Americans than today would apply to law school. We also expect that many African Americans who could get in somewhere would apply only to law schools that do not admit them. Even with affirmative action in place, hundreds of African Americans with solid credentials are currently rejected by every school to which they apply.⁴² An end of affirmative action, by restricting greatly the range of schools available to most African American applicants, would surely increase the number of futile applications. Thus, Sander's theory of a national admissions market, where, without affirmative action, the vast majority of African Americans would smoothly "cascade" down a tier or two is quite implausible.⁴³ In the real world, many African American students who could have gotten in somewhere will plunge from one or two admission offers to none.

As we have now seen, the matriculation decline that affirmative action would produce would have two sources. The first is the exclusion of students whose LSAT scores and UGPAs are so low that they could no longer secure admission to a school under the grid model. Applicant data from 2004 indicates that this decline would be approximately 32.5% of current African American law students, much more than the 14.1% that Sander forecasts on the basis of data from 2001. The second group are those who could still get into some law school somewhere but who either would no longer choose to apply, or would apply only to schools that would not admit them, or would be accepted someplace but decide not to attend. We cannot calculate the size of this group with precision, but we believe that an additional 10 to 15 percent or so decline in African American matriculants on top of the 32% is a conservative forecast. We thus estimate a total decline in African American enrollments of around 40 to 50 percent, about three times greater than Sander's prediction.

C. The Effects of Ending Affirmative Action on Law School Performance, Graduation and Passage of the Bar

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Nearly the entire second half of *Systemic Analysis* is devoted to the claim that African Americans law students do poorly in law school, on the bar, and in the labor market because they have been going to the wrong law schools.

Using regression analysis, Professor Sander attempts a straightforward tale: because of affirmative action, African American students arrive at law school with much lower LSATs and UGPAs than their white classmates. Because of their lower credentials, they get lower grades in law school than their white classmates do. Because they get lower grades

⁴¹ David B. Wilkins, *A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander*, 57 STAN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005).

⁴² In 2004, for example, 422 African American students with LSAT scores of 150 or more were denied admission to all the ABA-accredited schools to which they applied. Law Sch. Admission Council, Nat'l Decision Profiles, *supra* note ___. In 2003, the figure was 386.

⁴³ See Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 413. Yet another reason his cascade theory is unrealistic is that the vast majority of the 80 or so public law schools in the U.S. have student bodies overwhelmingly comprised of in-state residents. At these schools, state legislatures often limit the number of out-of-state students who may enroll, and the out-of-state applicants who are admitted tend to have higher LSATs and UGPAs than in-state students.

they graduate at lower rates than their classmates and fail the bar at much higher rates than their classmates. Since at each of these steps, according to Sander, the experience or special circumstances relating to being black have no statistical relationship to lower performance, black students would perform as well as whites if they simply went to schools where their entry credentials were like the white students. They are, in other words, the victims of a mismatch, affirmative action having seduced them into schools where they are doomed to do less well than they otherwise could. *Systemic Analysis's* ultimate conclusion is blunt: "By every means I have been able to quantify, blacks as a whole would be unambiguously better off in a system without any racial preferences at all than they are under the current regime."⁴⁴

Sander makes it sound so simple. A leads inexorably to B, and B leads inexorably to C. In fact, Sander misinterprets his own equations and vastly overstates what his data show. Examining his case with care, using the same data, we find that eliminating affirmative action would improve neither graduation nor bar passage rates to anywhere near the extent that Sander foresees. And when one turns from rates to numbers, we believe there would be a substantial net decline in the number of African Americans who become lawyers each year because the decrease in matriculation detailed in Section II would not be offset by substantial performance gains.

1. *Concerns About Statistical Methods*

Professor Sander rests all his important claims about black student performance on statistical analyses. If his analyses are inadequate, his conclusions are unreliable. If readers misinterpret the weight they should accord Sander's statistical results, they are likely to give more weight to his conclusions than they deserve. Hence we take a brief excursion into some statistical issues, for Professor Sander has significantly overreached in the conclusions he draws from his models.

To begin with, when *Systemic Analysis* discusses the relationship between entry credentials and later outcomes, such as graduation or bar passage, it invites readers to interpret measures of statistical significance as if they were measures of practical significance. Sander writes:

The "t-statistic" tells us how consistent or reliable a relationship is, with a higher t-statistic indicating a stronger, more reliable association. T-statistics generally increase as a function of the standardized coefficient and the size of the sample. T-statistics above 2.0 are usually taken to signify that the independent variable is genuinely helpful in predicting the dependent variable. A t-statistic of less than 2.0 indicates a weak, inconsistent relationship—one that might well be due to random fluctuations in the data.⁴⁵

T-statistics and their associated significance tests do not in themselves tell us whether a relationship is strong or weak or whether, "the independent variable is genuinely helpful in predicting the dependent variable," at least if what one means by "helpful" is that knowing the independent variable will, to some important degree, improve our ability to predict the

⁴⁴ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 482-83.

⁴⁵ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 428-29. Sander then notes, "The 'p-value' contains the same information as the t-statistic, but it has a more intuitive, accessible meaning." *Id.* at 429. Consequently, our criticism relates to Sander's presentation of p-values and t-statistics.

dependent variable.⁴⁶ Tests of statistical significance can be particularly misleading in large samples where weak relationships can easily be significant.⁴⁷ Sander's Table 6.1, in which he uses logistic regression to predict bar passage in a sample of 21,425 cases, provides an extreme illustration.⁴⁸ Because 95% of those in the sample who took the bar passed it, if one simply "predicts" that each person in the sample passed, she will be right 95% of the time. If one applies Sander's model which takes account of factors like law school grades and LSAT scores, the total number of correct predictions increases by 29 cases, so that 95.1% of all cases are predicted correctly.⁴⁹ In such a large dataset that miniscule improvement is significant at the .001 level, but Sander is not justified in characterizing Table 6.1 as a "robust test" of the notion that "race seems irrelevant"⁵⁰ on the bar exam, and his implication that it gives us a good idea of what distinguishes bar passers from those who never pass is wrong.⁵¹ We know little more about who passes and who fails the bar exam than the fact that most law school graduates pass, which we knew before we ran the regression.

In addition, Table 6.1 and the tables that present the results from Sander's other logistic regressions raise concerns about Sander's use and omission to use diagnostic statistics, that is, statistics which test the strength of the associations reported in the models, and how well they fit the data. One statistic frequently used for this purpose, but not included in *Systemic Analysis* is the Nagelkerke R-square.⁵² In Sander's Table 6.1, this figure is about .325⁵³, which had it been reported would have alerted the knowledgeable reader to the likelihood that Table 6.1 leaves much of what leads to bar passage unexplained.⁵⁴

⁴⁶ In his classic textbook, Blalock explains, "Statistical significance should not be confused with practical significance. Statistical significance can tell us only that certain sample differences would not occur very frequently by chance if there were no differences whatsoever in the population. It tells us nothing about the magnitude or importance of those differences." HUBERT BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 126 (1960).

⁴⁷ David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, *Reference Guide on Statistics*, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE GUIDE ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 379 (2nd ed., 2000) ("Statistical significance may result from a small correlation and a large number of points. In short, the *p*-value does not measure the strength or importance of an association."); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, *Reference Guide on Multiple Regression*, in REFERENCE GUIDE ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, *id.* at 178, 192 ("However, it is possible with a large data set to find statistically significant coefficients that are practically insignificant.").

⁴⁸ We devote considerable attention to Professor Sander's Table 6.1 both because the problems in it are common to many of Professor Sander's logistic regression models and because Professor Sander regards the inferences he draws from Table 6.1 as central to his entire analysis. Indeed, it is fair to say that if Table 6.1 does not stand, his entire analysis of the probable effects of ending affirmative action falls with it.

⁴⁹ Under a model that separately analyzes Native Americans, there is improvement of 31 cases (95.2%).

⁵⁰ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 445, 445 n.212.

⁵¹ Kaye & Freedman, *supra* note __, at 380-81. ("When practical significance is lacking—when the size of a disparity or correlation is negligible—there is no reason to worry about statistical significance.").

⁵² N.J.D. Nagelkerke, *A Note on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Determination*, 78 BIOMETRIKA 691 (1991); G. David Garson, *Logistic Regression*, in PA 765 STATNOTES: AN ONLINE TEXTBOOK, available at <http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm> ("[Nagelkerke's R²] is part of SPSS output and is the most-reported of the R-squared estimates."); Kenneth N. Klee, *One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcy Cases*, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1327 and n.154 (2002) (summarizing R², Cox and Snell's R², Nagelkerke's R², etc.).

⁵³ The Nagelkerke R² is not a true R² statistic as it is based on likelihood ratios, but it does give one some purchase on how well a logistic model is doing in explaining outcomes. We say "about 3.25" because we were unable to reproduce Sander's table 6.1 precisely. Our regression, for example, had about 0.25% more cases in it than Sander reports for his Table 6.1. We do not believe the differences are important, since the Wald statistics our model yielded were very close to those that Sander reports and the significance levels for the variables in the model were about the same.

⁵⁴ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 443.

Perhaps the most intuitively understandable information that Sander might have provided is information about how well his model does in identifying those who pass and fail the bar. His model generates for each graduate a predicted probability of passing the bar based on the graduate's scores on the independent variables and the overall likelihood that a person in the sample will pass the bar. One can thus distinguish between graduates who are predicted to have a 50% or better chance of passing the bar and those who are predicted to have a less than 50% chance of passing and compare these predictions to actual outcomes. Our replication of Sander's analysis indicates that his model, using the .5 cut-point, is highly accurate in predicting who passed the bar since it incorrectly labels as "fails" only 91 of the 20,399 graduates who passed. It does a dismal job, however, in predicting who will fail, as it correctly labels as fails only 129 of the 1074 sample students who actually did fail, for a success rate of only 12%.⁵⁵ Thus the variables included in Table 6.1 do not support Sander's claim that "If we know someone's law school grades, we can make a very good guess about how easily she will pass the bar."⁵⁶ In fact, if we just knew law school grades, we would label only 37 of those who failed correctly or 3.4%, and we would incorrectly guess that 45 of those who passed had failed. In other words, we would have predicted more bar outcomes correctly by predicting that everyone passed than we did by knowing the grades the graduates received in law school.

Rather than present a range of diagnostics that would have suggested the shakiness of its statistical foundations, *Systemic Analysis* presents only the Somers D statistic when it reports a logistic regression.⁵⁷ Moreover, Somers D is explained in a way that is likely to confuse those unfamiliar with it:

The "Somers's D" is a measure of the model's effectiveness in predicting outcomes. A model has a Somers's D of zero if it does not improve our ability to predict a typical individual's outcome; it has a value of one if it perfectly predicts every individual's outcome.⁵⁸

On seeing that Table 6.1 had a Somers D of .763 and baseline accuracy of about 95%, the reader might assume that the table was close to 99% accurate,⁵⁹ which would be impressive indeed. However, in light of the diagnostics we've just discussed the implication that we are dealing with a near perfect model is implausible. The reason for the apparent contradiction lies in the nature of logistic regression and how the Somers D statistic is

⁵⁵ One can use cut points other than .5; for example, one could predict that only those with a .75 probability of passing the bar would in fact pass. When one does this the ability to correctly predict failures increases but the false negative rate – actual passers who are predicted to fail – also rises.

⁵⁶ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 444.

⁵⁷ The Somers D is a standard diagnostics in SAS, but it is not a logistic regression option in some other popular logistic regression packages like SPSS and STATA.

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 438. See also *id.* at 438 n.191 ("For example, if 10% of our sample did not complete law school, we could guess any given person's graduation chances with 90% accuracy simply by consistently guessing that each person would graduate. A Somers's D of 0 in a model for predicting whether a person would graduate would thus indicate a model with that same 90% accuracy rate; a Somers's D of 100 would indicate a model with 100% accuracy; a Somers's D of .645, like the actual model above, would indicate a model with an accuracy of approximately 96.45%.")

⁵⁹ We reach this number by multiplying the difference between 95% and 100% or 5% by .763 and adding the result to 95%. See n.53, *supra*.

calculated. The bottom line is that given that about 95% of those who took the bar passed, Somer's D presents a misleading portrait of how the model does.⁶⁰ It certainly should not have been the only regression diagnostic presented.

Numerous other statistical problems can be found in Professor Sander's analysis. These include excluding race as a cause of outcomes in models plagued by multicollinearity,⁶¹ neglecting to model selection effects when predicting student performance⁶² and treating law school tier not as a set of nominal variables but as an interval scale measure.⁶³ In sum, the statistical misstatements and modeling errors in *Systemic Analysis* mean that the conclusions appear to have far more evidentiary support than they in fact do.

⁶⁰ Somer's D is a function of the number of concordant pairs, the number of discordant pairs and the number of case types. What this means is that if A who passed the bar had a probability of passing the bar of .95 and B who failed had a calculated probability of passing of .94, the case would be considered concordant and a success for the model. Similarly if C and D had bar passage probabilities of .05 and .04 respectively and student C passed the bar while D did not, the case would be considered concordant. Knowing the characteristics of A and B on the independent variables giving rise to these probabilities, however, would have predicted that both A and B would have passed the bar and would similarly have predicted that neither C nor D would have passed. Because the overall bar passage rate was so high, there is a very high initial probability that any given student would pass the bar. Thus it is likely that both individuals in many of the concordant pairs had estimated bar pass probabilities above 50%, leading to a high Somer's D, while at the same time producing a model that cannot accurately identify as failures most students who in fact failed. What this means is that the variables in Sander's Table 6.1 equation are predictive of the likelihood of bar passage, but they are not determinative to nearly the extent he suggests. A more detailed discussion of the working of Somer's D and the reasons for its limited utility in the context here is included in the web version of this article. *Supra*, n. ⁶¹ *Cf.* Kristine S. Knaplund & Richard H. Sander, *The Art and Science of Academic Support*, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 218 (1995) (In his appendix on regression, Sander notes, "Any time a regression includes two independent variables that are themselves closely associated, it is hard for a regression model to sort out which variable is causing what effect."). Sander also acknowledges multicollinearity in footnote 211 of *Systemic Analysis*, and indicates it is not a problem. While that argument may apply to OLS regression where regression coefficients are not distorted in logistic regression, multicollinearity can affect the regression weights as well as their significance levels. Thus, Sander includes in his table 6.1 LSGPA, LSAT scores and UGPA along with race. But the first three variables are highly correlated with race as well as with the dependent variable of bar passage. Indeed, the first three variables are better predictors of whether someone is black or white than they are, along with race, gender, and law school tier, of bar passage. Hence it is not surprising that when race is included in this model it has no significant effects. Moreover, since LSAT is validated only as a predictor of LSGPA, and the latter variable is in the model, LSAT arguably has no place in a well-specified model of variables predicting law school graduation.

⁶² Students are admitted to law schools for reasons the bar passage study measures, like their LSAT scores, and reasons it does not measure, like information from references describing work habits. If one is trying, as Sander is, to explain outcomes that may be affected by both measured and unmeasured variables and if people are selected for a treatment (e.g. entrance into a certain quality law school) in part for reasons the data do not measure, causal conclusions about the effects of the measured variables may be misleading. There are statistical ways to attempt to cope with this problem. Sander does not employ them. For example, Clydesdale uses Heckman regression methods to correct for sample selection bias in the BPS, Clydesdale, *supra* note __, at 717; and Alon and Tienda use both Heckman methods and propensity score analysis to control for selection bias in analyzing the mismatch hypothesis at the undergraduate level. Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, *Assessing the "Mismatch" Hypothesis: Differentials in College Graduation Rates by Institutional Selectivity*, 78 SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. __ (forthcoming 2005) (draft at 3).

⁶³ Sander acknowledges that including the tier variables as deviations from an omitted tier is the statistically appropriate method of modeling this variable, but he argues that this makes no difference. Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 439 n.194. This is relevant to the question of whether African Americans are "mismatched" and Sander's 4% solution. *Infra* Section

2. *Law School Performance and Graduation*

Sander assumes that if affirmative action ended, black students would attend law schools where they would have the same entry credentials as whites and forecasts that they would receive the same grades and graduate and pass the bar at the same rates as their white classmates.⁶⁴ Thus, his estimate in Table 8.2 that 7.9% more black attorneys would have entered the bar in 2001 without affirmative action derives from simply applying the white graduation rates and the bar pass rates in 1991 from the BPS to the black students in the same index score ranges (500-520, 520-540, etc.).

For several reasons, we believe that Sander overestimates the grades that black students would receive at the schools they would attend after an end of affirmative action, as well as their rates of graduation. First, one implication of our point about distinguishing statistical and practical significance is that any gains in law school grades that would occur without affirmative action would likely have little or no effect on the rate of graduation of the African Americans remaining in law school.⁶⁵ Their chances of graduating would be about what they are today, even if they attend lower tier law schools, perhaps slightly better for some and slightly worse for others depending on the tier they moved from and the tier they moved to.⁶⁶ (The likely outcomes on the bar exam are similarly murky, as we will discuss in the next Section.)

Secondly, Sander's expectation that African Americans will earn the same grades as their white classmates derives from his assumption that, if affirmative action ended, the entry credentials of African American and white students at any given school would be the same.⁶⁷ His assumption is unjustified. Even if law school adopted strictly "race-neutral" admissions criteria and each school selected all admittees from a common pool of students within the same above-average range of LSAT scores and UGPAs, it would still be the case that, within that range, the African American applicants and admittees would, on average, have lower LSATs and UGPAs than the whites, because that is where African American students fall in the overall national pool of applicants.⁶⁸

A wide range of scholars has recognized the inevitable persistence of credential

⁶⁴ Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 429 n.175 ("[T]he data show that if blacks were admitted to law schools through race-neutral selection, they would perform as well as whites."). This is the corollary of Sander's claim, "It is only a slight oversimplification to say that the performance gap in Table 5.1 is a by-product of affirmative action." *Id.* at 429.

⁶⁵ *Cf.* Wightman, *Threat to Diversity*, *supra* note __, at 35 (noting that while LSAT and UGPA had validity in the admissions process, for the BPS "they are not significant predictors of graduation from law school.>").

⁶⁶ *Cf. id.* at 36 tbl.7. (projecting that African Americans admitted under race-blind admissions in 1991 would have a 80.49% graduation rate compared to 77.90% for those who would be denied admission under a regression model based on LSAT and UGPA). If this model overstates the impact of ending affirmative action, as Sander argues, one would expect even greater convergence between black graduation rates with and without affirmative action.

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 474 n.282.

⁶⁸ INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH 46 (Claude S. Fischer et al., eds., 1996) ("Race-neutral selection processes pass disparities in the applicant pool through the freshman class. Therefore, we cannot read a gap in test scores as if it reflected an edge that the admission process gives to some students at the expense of others."). For example, for admittees to UCLA Law School in 2003, the LSAT 25th percentile was 162 and the 75th percentile was 168. We would expect the typical African American admitted under race-blind admissions to UCLA would be much more likely to have a 162 than a 168 on the LSAT.

disparities between black and white students within selective institutions even after an end of affirmative action. Bowen and Bok, supporters of affirmative action, recognized it,⁶⁹ as did Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, who are critics.⁷⁰ So have many other observers.⁷¹

In the months since the appearance of his article, Sander has acknowledged that a gap in black-white entry credentials would persist within law schools, but dismisses the disparity as trivial, estimating that post-affirmative action the black-white credential gap at any given school would average only 6 points on a 1000-point scale.⁷² We were not able to obtain a step-by-step description of how Sander came up with his estimate of only a 6-point gap in time for this submission. However, our review of the relevant literature,⁷³ as well our look at the BPS,⁷⁴ suggest that a gap this small is exceedingly unlikely.⁷⁵

Consider, for example, what happened at several California law schools in the early years after Proposition 209 prohibited taking race into account in admissions, years when even Sander appears to concede that the law schools were rigorously complying with

⁶⁹ WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, *THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS* 42-43 (1998) (at College and Beyond institutions where they had detailed application data, they found that realistic race-blind simulations only marginally closed the black-white SAT gap and that the African Americans who would have been admitted would still have had much lower SAT scores than the whites).

⁷⁰ Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, *Reflections on the Shape of the River*, 46 *UCLA L. REV.* 1583, 1628 n.168 (1999) (book review) (treating a three-digit black-white SAT gap among Berkeley's 1998 admits (on a 400-1600 scale) as unremarkable).

⁷¹ Liu, *supra* note __, at 1064; Expert Report of Claude M. Steele in *Grutter v. Bollinger* and *Gratz v. Bollinger*, reprinted in 5 *MICH. J. RACE & L.* 439, 449 (1999); Thomas J. Kane, *Misconceptions in the Debate Over Affirmative Action in College Admissions*, in *CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES* 17, 19-20 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller, eds., 1998); Fischer et al., *supra* note __, at 46; Roland G. Fryer Jr. et al., *Color-Blind Affirmative Action* (Nov 2003), NBER Working Paper No. w10103, available at <http://www.yale.edu/law/leo/papers/fryer.pdf>; [Fryer will provide means and SDs, with Mellon Foundation clearance].

⁷² At a panel at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools and in his rejoinder to a draft of this response posted on his website.

⁷³ See sources cited, *supra* footnotes __. See also William T. Dickens & Thomas J. Kane, *Racial Test Score Differences as Evidence of Reverse Discrimination: Less than Meets the Eye*, 38 *INDUS. REL.* 331, 347-48 (1999) (“Reasonable values for the correlation of tests with performance and white-black differences in other abilities suggest that test score differences between the average equally qualified black and white could easily be as large as .85 standard deviation.”).

⁷⁴ For instance, we looked at tier 3 schools in the BPS, since without affirmative action many black students now at elite schools might find these were the schools that would admit them. Among whites admitted to schools in this tier, 80% had index scores between -1.1239 standard deviations below the mean and .2166 standard deviations above it (the 10th and 90th percentiles). If we look at all whites and African Americans with scores in this range, which we might think of as the normal range of admits, we find that the median black admittee's index is almost half a standard deviation below the median white admittee's index (Whites = -.2689 and African Americans = -.7545.) These within-tier differences are likely to be attenuated within tiers at particular law schools, but they are still likely to be considerable within schools and overlap substantially across same tier schools.

⁷⁵ One may find similar claims about the implications of ending affirmative action for the black-white credential gap in RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, *THE BELL CURVE* 451-55 (1994); Gail L. Heriot & Christopher T. Wonnell, *Standardized Tests Under the Magnifying Glass: A Defense of the LSAT Against Recent Charges of Bias*, 7 *TEX. REV. L. & POL.* 467, 476-77 (2003), but in each case the claim is based entirely on speculation with no evidence.

Proposition 209.⁷⁶ In 1997-1999, the African American students who were admitted to the law schools at Berkeley, UCLA, and UC Davis had test scores and grades within the same range as the white admittees but, as a group, the African American admittees had LSAT scores 5-7 points lower than whites on a scale with a 60-point range, and as well as lower UGPAs.⁷⁷ Admissions credentials differences that large translate to a black-white gap of about 75 points on Sander's 1000-point scale.⁷⁸ At many law schools, a gap this large among whites would translate into a standard deviation or more.⁷⁹ Similar gaps between the credentials of entering African Americans and whites persisted among undergraduates at UC Berkeley in the years immediately after Proposition 209⁸⁰ and the University of Texas at Austin in the year immediately after the *Hopwood* decision,⁸¹ as well as among students at the University of California medical schools.⁸² Thus, if Sander's claim is correct that "one hundred persons with an LSAT score of 161 are highly likely to have higher law school grades and higher pass rates on the bar than one hundred persons with an LSAT of 160,"⁸³ then the presence of continuing black-white disparities among same-school matriculants renders untenable his claim that, post-affirmative action, African Americans would do as well as their white classmates.

Third, *Systemic Analysis* is wrong for yet another reason in concluding that, within schools, African American students would perform as well as whites absent affirmative action. As studies conducted by the LSAC have shown more than once, even among white and black students with identical entry credentials, black students typically receive somewhat lower law-school grades than whites.⁸⁴

⁷⁶ Sander, *A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 418 n.141; Richard H. Sander, *Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action*, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997); Richard Sander, *Colleges Will Just Disguise Racial Quotas*, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at B11. Sander believes that cheating by admissions staffs has gone on more recently, but entirely without cheating, a gap in admissions credentials is certain to continue.

⁷⁷ Ellen Cook, UC Admissions Data Vault (2003), available at http://home.sandiego.edu/~e_cook/.

⁷⁸ Admittedly, the gap on the LSAT among *matriculants* (data which we could not obtain in time for this essay) would be smaller in absolute terms given that the top admittees to UC law schools enroll at more elite schools like Stanford. On the other hand, the relative size of the test score gap among matriculants at a school like UCLA is also shaped by the fact that the LSAT standard deviation is smaller among matriculants than admits for the same reason.

⁷⁹ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 416 tbl. 3.2. (At four of the six tiers of law schools, the standard deviation on the index for whites was between 73 and 75.)

⁸⁰ Prop. 209 shrank the African Americans admission rate from nearly 50% in 1997 to 20% in 1998, but for the 333 matriculating African American freshmen in 1998-2000 who were not recruited athletes, the 75th percentile score on the SAT was 57-90 points lower each year than the 25th percentile for Berkeley's white freshmen. Data provided by UC Berkeley Office of the Assistant Vice Chancellor—Admissions & Enrollment Unit (Jan. 2005). Note this was before UC adopted the 4% Plan and "comprehensive review."

⁸¹ Gary M. Lavergne & Bruce Walker, Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law (BH 588) at the University of Texas at Austin Demographic Analysis Fall 2002 16 tbl.7(b) (Jan. 2003), available at <http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-Report5.pdf> (reporting a mean black-white gap among 1997 UT-Austin freshmen, prior to the 10% plan, of 156 points on the SAT (black n = 185)).

⁸² The hundreds of African Americans and Latinos offered admission at the five UC medical schools in 1997-99, had UGPAs which were over one-quarter of a grade point lower than white/Asian American admittees, as well as substantial MCAT differences. Ellen Cook, UC Admissions Data Vault, *supra* note __.

⁸³ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 423 n.159. Needless to say, we believe the credential gap would be much larger than 1 point on the LSAT, which is why this is a significant issue even though we believe Sander overstates the connection between index scores and bar passage.

⁸⁴ See e.g. Lisa C. Anthony and Mei Liu, Analysis of Differential Prediction of Law School Performance by Racial/Ethnic Subgroups Based on the 1996-1998 Entering Law School Classes, Law School Admissions

Sander's contrary prediction rests entirely on his analysis of a dataset that he assembled of first-semester law school grades at twenty schools in 1995. He calls it the National Survey of Law School Performance (NSLSP). He used this dataset, and not the Bar Passage Study (BPS) dataset that he relied for all other tables on law school and bar performance. If he had used the BPS, he would have reached quite different conclusions, conclusions that would have been more consistent with almost all the research that has been done relating standardized test scores among African Americans to later graded performance. One of our co-authors, Timothy Clydesdale, in another article, used the BPS to analyze law school grades and found that after controlling for LSAT scores and undergraduate grades, being African American remained negatively related to performance.⁸⁵ Moreover, he found that African American students were not alone in this regard: Latinos, Asian Americans, and law students over 30 also underperformed.⁸⁶

While Sander gives reasons in a footnote for not using the BPS, reasons that have force but are not fully persuasive,⁸⁷ his own choice to analyze the NSLSP and the model he used to analyze it raise serious problems. As an initial matter, the NSLSP is limited by containing information on grades in the first semester of law school only.⁸⁸ Sander offers no evidence that first-semester grades are a reliable guide to performance during the rest of law school.⁸⁹ Even more troubling, in performing his analysis of the NSLSP, Sander handled the race of students in a highly peculiar manner. The NSLSP has an abnormally high rate of missing data about race, with 24.6% (1,176 of 4,774) of the respondents refusing to provide their race or other background information. (By contrast, in the same year just 0.6% (272) of the

Council LSAT Technical Report 00-02 10 fig. 4c (April 2003). Note there is considerable variation across schools in Figure 4c, including underprediction at a dozen schools. *Id.*

⁸⁵ In a OLS regression on first year grades of 24,998 students in the BPS, using LSAT, UGPA, racial groups and law school tiers as controls, being black (as opposed to white) has an unstandardized co-efficient of -.687, $p < .001$. Tables and a fuller explanation are included in our on-line version of this paper, *infra* note ____.

⁸⁶ Clydesdale, *supra* note __, at 754. See also Anthony and Liu, *supra* note __, at fig.5c, fig.6c.

⁸⁷ Sander rejected the BPS because it did not standardize, for each law school, the LSAT scores and undergraduate grades of its students. Without standardizing, he believes that regression results on law school performance using the BPS would “be meaningless at best” and “highly misleading at worst” Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __ at 428 n.172. There is substance to his concern. Clydesdale sought to deal with the standardization problem by controlling for law school tier. This control should help because law schools tend to be homogenous within tiers (and different across tiers) on admissions credentials. Indeed, Sander himself described the standard deviation among whites and among African Americans in tier one schools as “strikingly small.” *Id.* at 415. They are similarly small at most of the other tiers. See *id.* at 416 tbl.3.2. Still, we cannot be confident how well the tier control does its job. The Anthony and Liu’s work does not have this problem, however, and its consistency with Clydesdale’s findings is good reason to believe Clydesdale’s findings are correct.

⁸⁸ Sander’s Table 5.2 is mislabeled “First-Year Grades.” *Id.* at 428. The dataset actually includes first-semester grades only. *Id.* at 421. On the page before table 5.2, is table 5.1, which is based on the BPS and which is also labeled “First-Year Grades” This table actually does report grades for the full first year.

⁸⁹ We had a research assistant study the grades of a randomly chosen sample of University of Michigan law students. She found that, among black students from two successive graduating classes, the grades they received during their first term explained only 26% of the variance in the grades they received in their third year ($R = .520$). These results are from one school only, but they may suggest why all the factors in Sander’s model explain only 19% of variance (Table 5.2), when LSAC studies of ABA law schools covering the same period, which included only data on LSAT and unadjusted UGPA, explain 25% of variance in school grades for the full first year. Lisa A. Anthony et al., Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of the 1995-96 Correlation Studies 6 tbl.2 (1999); Wightman, *Threat to Diversity*, *supra* note __, at 31-34.

42,151 first-year matriculants at ABA law schools refused to report their race/ethnicity to LSAC.⁹⁰) Sander compounded the problem by lumping those who did not report their race together with his white respondents, on the assumption that those who did not reveal their race were probably white.⁹¹ In some contexts such an assumption might be plausible, but not for the NSLSP, because other evidence within the NSLSP strongly suggests that a large proportion of those who did not report their race were not white.⁹² Table 2 displays three ways that Sander might have handled the missing-data group in his analysis: the way that he did and two methodologically more appropriate (though not perfect) ways, one excluding the non-respondents and the other treating them as a separate category. Under either alternative, being black is significantly and negatively associated with law school grades. The likely ultimate difference in grades between whites and African Americans with identical credentials would be modest but not trivial, with African Americans ending up about 5 or 6 percent lower in class rank than white students with the same credentials. The predicted differences between the groups might well have been greater if all NSLSP students had actually answered the question about race. Accordingly, in the analysis of the NSLSP, race appears irrelevant only when the data are mishandled.⁹³

Table 2: Factors Associated with First-Semester Law School GPA, Comparing Sander’s Model with Alternative Models

Independent Variable	Sander’s Table 5.2 results		Corrected Model 1, separately identifying non-reported race with dummy variable		Corrected Model 2, eliminating respondents with missing race data	
	Std Coef.	t-statistic	Std Coef.	t-statistic	Std Coef.	t-statistic
ZLSAT	0.385***	25.975	.365***	24.463	.338***	18.839
ZUGPA	0.212***	14.915	.202***	14.171	.204***	12.082
Male	.018	1.289	.020	1.454	.037*	2.281
Asian	-.007	-.516	-.025†	-1.747	-.030†	-1.864
Black	-.007	-.480	-.030*	-1.996	-.042*	-2.351
Hispanic	-.011	-.793	-.029*	-2.010	-.039*	-2.296
Other (Reported ¹) Race	-.021	-1.489	-.040**	-2.816	-.048**	-2.948
Race Not Reported	Neither excluded nor separately identified		-.103***	7.055	Excluded	
Model N	N=4,257		N=4,257		N=3,231	

⁹⁰ LSAC, *Minority Databook*, *supra* note __ at 28 (fall of 1995). An additional 2.7% classified themselves as “other.” *Id.*

⁹¹ Sander states that as far as he can determine “students not reporting race were predominantly white or Asian, which supports the approach taken in the table.” Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 430 n.175.

⁹² Within the NSLSP, the LSATs, UGPAs, and law school grades (see Model 1 above) of those declining to state their racial/ethnic group are midway between the black and white averages. In addition, 16% of the NSLSP respondents who failed to report their race reported elsewhere on the survey “substantial hostility along racial lines,” compared to 8% of respondents identifying themselves as white, 19% of those identifying themselves as Hispanic, and 31 % of those identifying themselves as black. Thus we think it is almost certain that the race non-respondents included a substantial proportion of non-whites. It is no wonder that when this group is lumped together with the whites, white performance appears not that different from minority performance. Sander knew about the problem of lumping race nonrespondents with whites prior to the publication of his article, but left Table 5.2 as it was. *Id.* at 430, n.175.

⁹³ And consistent with Clydesdale’s analysis of the BPS, for the NSLSP it is not just black students who tend to receive lower grades than whites controlling for admissions credentials. This appears true of all ethnic groups, though the significance levels for Asians are marginal, possibly because of a smaller sample size.

Adjusted R-square	.190	.199	.175
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Source: National Survey of Law School Performance.

†(p<.1); *(p<.05); **(p<.01); ***(p<.001) ¹Native American, Pacific Islander, multiracial, or “other” race.

Our analyses of both the NSLSP and BPS thus reveal that Sander is wrong when he concludes that the current lower performance by African Americans in law school is “a simple and direct consequence of the disparity in entering credentials between African Americans and whites.”⁹⁴ It is not. Exactly why African Americans perform somewhat less well in law school than their credentials would predict remains unclear. It may be due in part due to statistical artifacts,⁹⁵ but it could also reflect a variety of phenomena related to the experience black students have in law schools.⁹⁶ Sander explicitly rejects the possibility that stereotype threat and test anxiety contribute to African Americans’ lower grades.⁹⁷ He does so by pointing, over and over, to a finding from the NSLSP that the gap between the grades of black and white law students is as large in first year writing courses, where students have plenty of time for their assignments, as it is in more traditional first year courses with timed exams⁹⁸ It turns out, however, that NSLSP data are of little value for making this claim. The NSLSP sample included only 59 African American students with grades in first-semester writing courses, and 46 of them attended a single law school where the black students may have had particularly poor writing skills.⁹⁹

Sander concludes his section on law school performance with a discussion of graduation rates. The BPS revealed that 19.2% of African American students and 8.2% of white students who started law school in 1991 failed to complete law school within six years. Sander finds that within the BPS, law school grades are by far the best predictor of who graduates and that being African American is unrelated to graduation. However, as we explained in Section III.A, Sander’s conclusion reaches far beyond what is supported by his data and even if black students grades improved somewhat, the rate of graduation might be change very little.¹⁰⁰ Even if first-semester law school grades are the most important

⁹⁴ *Id.* at 427.

⁹⁵ See e.g., Robert L. Linn & C. Nicholas Hastings, *Group Differentiated Prediction*, 8 APPLIED PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 165 (1984).

⁹⁶ See Clydesdale, *supra* note __, at 758-61. In a study co-authored by Sander of 1,100 third-year law students at eleven law schools, the authors found, “Women, blacks, and Asians are disproportionately represented among the alienated students.” Mitu Gulati et al., *The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third Tear of Law School*, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 255 (2001). An interesting and related issue that we cannot test empirically is whether the ending of affirmative action itself would cause a worsened campus climate that might translate into lower rates of completing law school for African Americans. The post-209 climate issue was raised by students of color at UCLA and other UC law schools in *Grutter*. See *Grutter Testimony of Chrystal Blossom James*, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 433, 438 (2001); Brief of the UCLA Law Students of Color et al. as *Amici Curiae* in *Grutter v. Bollinger* (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/_gru_amicus-ussc/um/UCLA-gru.doc. Cf. Cecil J. Hunt, II, *Guests in Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar Performance*, 23 FLA. ST. L. REV. 721, 774 (1996).

⁹⁷ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 427. For a summary of the research literature on stereotype threat, see e.g. Claude M. Steele et al., *Contending with Group Image: The Psychology of Stereotype Threat and Social Identity Theory*, 34 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 379-440 (M. Zanna ed., 2002).

⁹⁸ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __ at 373, 424, 427, 434.

⁹⁹ Of the 20 schools in the NSLSP, this school has by far the lowest ranking in the *U.S. News* ranking of law schools. In a footnote, Sander acknowledges the need for more research and that his legal writing sample is “small.” *Id.* at 434 n.182.

¹⁰⁰ We essentially reproduced Sander’s results, with coefficient significance levels and the relative importance of the independent variables being close to the same (e.g. The Wald statistic for LSGPA in our model is 1460.75;

predictor of graduation among the variables in the model, and even if we know first-semester grades and all the other information in the model, there is still much we don't know about the causes of failing to finish law school.

3. *Performance on the Bar Examination*

The Bar Passage Study was undertaken by LSAC to explore whether whites, African Americans and other racial and ethnic groups passed the bar at similar rates and, more broadly, to explore what factors account for who does and does not pass the bar.¹⁰¹ Building on surveys of the entering law school class of 1991, it remains the only substantial national study ever conducted of African American and white bar passage. The BPS found that, among students who graduated from law school in 1994 or 1995 and who took a bar examination one or more times before the end of 1996, 3.3% of whites and 22.4% of African Americans never passed the exam. Sander believes that, if affirmative action ended, African Americans, no longer mismatched, would perform in law school as well as their white classmates, and then graduate and pass the bar at the same rates.¹⁰² He believes that, in this way, about three-fourths of the bar passage gap between whites and African Americans would be eliminated.¹⁰³

We have already discussed the reasons we believe that Sander, in discussing his analysis of bar passage in Table 6.1 and the mismatch theory he builds from it, has greatly overstated the degree to which law school grades and entry credential actually help distinguish between those who pass the bar and those who fail.¹⁰⁴ But ultimately his

in Sander's it is 1452.36). Looking at diagnostics that Sander does not present, we found a Nagelkerke R^2 of .261. While the model is almost perfect (99.7% accurate) in correctly identifying those who graduate when the criteria for predicting graduation is an estimated probability of graduation that is .5 or more, it does miserably in predicting who will not graduate, as it correctly identifies only 10.8% of those who do not graduate, a result, almost certainly, of a highly skewed data set as well as model deficiencies.

¹⁰¹ Henry Ramsey, Jr., *Historical Introduction*, in LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY iii-vii (1998).

¹⁰² Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 448-54. Sander tries to bolster his case for the mismatch hypothesis by citing others who have studied the issue, chiefly at the undergraduate level. *Id.* at 450-54. But the evidence from other studies is mixed and most are poorly matched to the situation of American law schools. We address many of Sander's claims about the implications of the literature he cites in our longer web version. We do want to note that one article Sander relies on in his web reply, Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, *Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College*, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1491 (2002), has a more nuanced message when read in context. Dale and Krueger found that "the school a student attends is systematically related to his or her subsequent earnings," *id.* at 1518, and that "the returns to school characteristics such as average SAT score or tuition are greatest for students from more disadvantaged backgrounds." *Id.* at 1524-25. There were apparently too few black students in the 1976 College and Beyond sample for Dale and Krueger to separate African Americans from whites with respect to disadvantage, but we know from the BPS data that African Americans in law school have significantly more disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds than whites. Wightman, *Threat to Diversity*, *supra* note __, at 42 n.99 tbl.N7 (50.7% versus 22.3% are lower-middle class). For a well done refutation of the undergraduate mismatch hypothesis, see Alon & Tienda, *supra* note __.

¹⁰³ Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note __, at 474 n.282.

¹⁰⁴ See *infra* Section IIB2. That Sander has not sufficiently established a strong connection between index scores and eventual bar outcomes is corroborated in other ways. For example, in Section IV Sander claims that LSAT scores and UGPAs explain "well over 35%" of the variance in bar exam results, which he characterizes as an "impressive" figure. Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note __, at 421. However, that claim is not accurate as applied to the BPS. Sander cites an unpublished study of the July 2003 California bar by Klein and Bolus, who looked at scaled bar scores (a 1460, 1470, etc.), not exam pass/fail, the question that we and Sander are addressing here. Wightman's analysis of the BPS data, the best nationwide data we have,

mismatch theory is unconvincing because it fails to stand up against the data that the BPS itself offers about bar passage by students of similar credentials at different tiers of schools. A simple prediction flows directly from the mismatch hypothesis: for a black student with a given index score, the lower the student's tier, the better he or she should do in law school and on the bar. Indeed, it shouldn't matter whether the student has a higher or lower index score than other students in the tier; either way that student should be advantaged on the bar if Sander is correct in his suppositions, because she should get better grades than she otherwise would and be more likely to graduate and pass the bar.¹⁰⁵

Table 3 displays what we find when we look within the BPS at African American students with similar credentials who attended schools of different tiers. For the table, we computed Sander's admission index for each black student based on their LSAT and UGPA. We then divided the students into five groups (quintiles) according to their index score and then looked at the bar passage rate among matriculants within each index group across the tiers of schools. If Sander's hypothesis was sound, one would expect to find that as one looks across each row, the percentage of students who passed the bar would increase. Given the same index, students at each successively lower tier should do better on the bar.

Table 3: Percentages of African American Matriculants Who Passed the Bar, by Tier of School Attended and Admissions Index Among African Americans Matriculants

	Elite	Prestige	2 nd Tier Public	2 nd Tier Private	Historically Minority	3 rd Tier	Total
Index in lowest 20%	*	21.4% (3:11)	32.4% (22:46)	42.2% (38:52)	34.4% (43:82)	34.8% (16:30)	35.6% (122:221)
Index in 2 nd lowest 20%	*	48.3% (14:15)	57.9% (55:40)	50.0% (49:49)	58.9% (42:30)	32.0% (8:17)	53.1% (171:151)
Index in middle 20%	75.0% (12:4)	54.0% (27:23)	64.8% (81:44)	46.9% (46:52)	70.7% (41:17)	50.0% (6:6)	59.3% (213:146)
Index in 2 nd highest 20%	92.0% (23:2)	67.2% (41:20)	76.7% (99:30)	65.9% (58:30)	75.8% (25:8)	*	72.7% (250:94)
Index in highest 20%	90.3% (84:9)	85.9% (85:14)	81.7% (67:15)	86.6% (39:6)	85.7% (18:3)	*	86.4% (299:47)

Source: Bar Passage Study

Ratios in parentheses are n = eventual known pass to n = known fail + non-graduating black matriculants.

Black law school graduates with unknown bar exam results are excluded.

* = Fewer than 10 cases.

reveals that LSAT and UGPA explain only about 10% of the variance in bar exam pass/fail status. Wightman, *Threat to Diversity*, *supra* note __, at 38-39; WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY, *supra* note __, at 37-40. Only by including law school grades in the model -- unknown when admission decisions are made -- could Wightman explain 35% of variance in bar pass/fail status within the BPS. *Id.* at 39 (for 39 jurisdictions with sufficient data, a .58 correlation between LGPA +LSAT and bar passage within jurisdictions, and a .52 correlation across jurisdictions).

¹⁰⁵ In our longer web version we also present differences in black-white bar pass rates by law school tier and student index score. This analysis shows that differences between white and black bar passage rates are substantial among those with similar index scores attending the same tier law school, contrary to the mismatch hypothesis expectations, with whites index groups almost nearly always outperforming African Americans in the same index group. Differences between white and black bar passage rates controlling for tier tended to be least in the elite and the 2nd tier public schools, though according to Sander's data the average mismatch in these tiers is as great as it is in all tiers except the historically black schools.

When we examine Table 3, however, what we see are many relationships consistent with the mismatch hypothesis and an equal number that are inconsistent.¹⁰⁶ This mix of results does not mean that we can say the mismatch hypothesis is partially proven.¹⁰⁷ Rather, it suggests simply that the mismatch theory hasn't been proven at all.

There are, nonetheless some intriguing patterns within the results of Table 3. Look first at those black law students who attended elite law schools. Almost none of these students were in the 2 lowest quintiles of the black admissions index across all schools,¹⁰⁸ but those in the other three quintiles, contrary to the mismatch theory, passed the bar at higher rates than similarly credentialed black students in all other tiers. Now look at the other extreme, students in the 3rd tier schools, which attract few black students in the top two quintiles.¹⁰⁹ In nearly all cases, black students in these schools do worse or no better than students in the same index quintiles at higher-ranking law schools. Thus, in neither the most elite schools nor the least elite schools does the mismatch theory find support.

Table 3 offers other interesting comparisons, but no consistent message. Perhaps most striking is the performance of students at historically black schools. If index credentials are held constant, these students perform on the bar about as well as or better than black students in all other tiers except the elite tier. If we didn't have the data on 3rd tier law schools, we might suppose we had here evidence for the mismatch hypothesis.¹¹⁰ But it seems far more likely that the performance of students in the historically black law schools supports a different hypothesis: namely that there is something about cultural understandings in or the educational atmosphere surrounding most predominantly white law schools that keeps many black students from reaching their potential.¹¹¹ Why exactly this occurs is beyond the scope of this essay, but stereotype threat, financial circumstances, and

¹⁰⁶ In our longer web version we also use regression analysis to look at the effects of tier placement on performance for students with similar index scores. This has the advantage of treating the index score as a continuous rather than a discrete variable. The results ran strongly counter to mismatch hypothesis predictions. We have chosen to use a tabular presentation here because we think most readers will find the results easier to understand.

¹⁰⁷ Absent some sound theoretical basis for conditioning the mismatch hypothesis so that it can be expected to apply only in some and not other comparisons, the inconsistent pattern of relationships we see in Table 3.

¹⁰⁸ In fact, at the elite schools, there were only 2 African Americans in the bottom two quintiles. Both passed the bar.

¹⁰⁹ There were a combined total of only 10 black students at the Tier 3 schools with indexes in the top two quintiles. 6 of them passed the bar.

¹¹⁰ Even if going to a black school countered mismatches, it wouldn't help much in producing new black attorneys since those displaced by the cascaders down would in large part be African Americans, many of whom Sander counts as likely law school matriculants in his grid model.

¹¹¹ Henry Braddock II & William T. Trent, *Correlates of Academic Performance among Black Graduate and Professional Students*, in COLLEGE IN BLACK AND WHITE: AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN PREDOMINANTLY WHITE AND IN HISTORICALLY BLACK PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 161, 173 (Walter R. Allen et al. eds., 1991) ("For Black professional students, grade performance is explained by a more diverse set of factors including social background factors such as sex and age, major-field competitiveness, interaction with white faculty, and the presence and role of Black faculty in the students' programs."). A parallel phenomenon appears at the undergraduate level, see e.g., Walter R. Allen, *The Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities*, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 41 (1992) ("Finally, little doubt exists over the negative impact of hostile racial and social relationships on Black student achievement.").

the presence of black faculty could conceivably play a role.¹¹²

One plausible criticism of our comparison of students with similar index scores at different tiers of schools is that we cannot be certain that a student at an elite school really is similar to a student at a lower-tier school just because they have the same index.¹¹³ For example, a black candidate graduating from Yale is more likely to go to an elite law school like Stanford, and may have better college preparation or other unmeasured characteristics than a black student with the same index score (based solely on LSAT and UGPA) who graduated from a community college and enrolled at a middle-ranked law school. This is the problem of selection bias and we actually think that point is valid to an extent, but note that this is an odd argument in light of the core thesis in *Systemic Analysis*: Sander has tried to establish that lower African American law school (and bar) performance is “simply a function” of lower LSATs and UGPAs,¹¹⁴ but if he has succeeded in doing so, then the effect of selection bias on bar performance should be negligible.¹¹⁵

In another article in this issue, Ayres and Brooks identified a second way to test the mismatch theory that uses the BPS dataset and that largely (though not entirely) avoids the problem of selection bias.¹¹⁶ We find the Ayres-Brooks analysis on this point compelling.¹¹⁷ Here is a very brief summary of what they found. Within the BPS dataset, they identified a substantial group of black students all of whom had been admitted to two or more schools, one of which was their “first choice.” They then divided this group into two subgroups and

¹¹² For literature on stereotype threat, see Steele et al., *supra* note . A second hypothesis is that financial circumstances leading to higher drop out rates (and hence nonpassage of the bar) at more elite schools, since the predominantly minority law schools have the least expensive tuition of any tier. Wightman, *Consequences of Race-Blindness*, *supra* note __ at 246 n.28. A third hypothesis is that that the interaction at historically black law schools with many black faculty members is a positive factor. See Elizabeth Mertz, et al., *What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for Legal Education*, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 74 (1998) (systematic observational study of classrooms in eight law schools for an entire semester, finding: “The most striking [pattern] is the connection between the presence of a teacher of color and greater participation by students of color.”).

¹¹³ Sanders made this response at a panel at the Annual Meeting of the AALS.

¹¹⁴ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note __, at 429; see also calculations underlying 473 tbl.8.2.

¹¹⁵ We think that Sander was correct in his web reply and not in his article and that selection by law schools on unmeasured variables that also correlate with success occurs and should be taken into account in building causal models. We are not attempting causal modeling; rather we are presenting a portrait of what happens, or happened with the 1991 cohort, under affirmative action. We believe, for example, that the strong performance of elite students compared to students in other tiers with similar index scores reflects the fact that the admissions officers in elite schools are doing their job well and admitting those black students who, apart from their index scores, seem like and are good prospects for success. Cf. Lempert et al., *supra* note __, at 485-90 (survey of 1970-96 Michigan alumni found that students of color, two-thirds of whom were black, had significantly higher civic service contributions in law practice than their white classmates.).

Sander cites undergraduate school is an unmeasured variable that can influence law school admission, and it is plausible to think that it also influences law school success. But several LSAC validity studies show that adjusting UGPA based on a ranking of quality of the undergraduate institution does not consistently improve the prediction of law school grades above the combination of students’ LSATs and unadjusted UGPAs. See e.g., Donald A. Rock & Franklin R. Evans, *The Effectiveness of Several Grade Adjustment Methods for Predicting Law School Performance*, in LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH: VOLUME IV, 1978-1983 363, 444 (1984) (arguing “against the use of these types of grade adjustment techniques” in part because of “relatively modest and unstable validity gains”).

¹¹⁶ Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, *Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?*, 57 STAN. L. REV. __ (2005) (draft at pages 14 – 21).

¹¹⁷ After reading their article in draft, we performed our own analysis of the data and reached the same results they do.

compared, as to law school grades and bar passage rates, the students who elected to attend their first choice school with the students who attended their second or third. Ayres and Brooks reasoned that, if the mismatch theory were sound, the students who elected to attend their second choice schools ought to perform better in law school and on the bar than those who went to their first choice school. Their approach largely controlled for selection bias because the students attending their second choice schools had been attractive enough as applicants that they could have been at a more elite school. Upon running regressions, Ayers and Brooks found that students who attended their second choice school neither received better first year grades nor passed the bar at higher rates (after possible multiple takings) than those who went to their first choice school,¹¹⁸ and concluded that, for black students, the BPS does not support Sander’s mismatch theory.

C. The Bottom Line: The Net Effects on the Numbers of African American Lawyers

In Table 8.2 of his article, Sander makes an overall forecast about the effects of ending affirmative action. He concludes that, despite a decline of 14% in the numbers of black students admitted to law school, there would have been, in 2001, a net increase of 7.9% in the numbers of black attorneys entering the bar. In Table 4, we have done our own calculations of the same steps in Table 8.2 and reach quite different estimates.

Table 4: Contrasting Estimates of the Effects of Eliminating Affirmative Action on the Production of African American Attorneys

Stage of the Process	Sander’s Estimates (using data from 1991 and 2001)	Our Rough Estimates (using data from 1991 and 2004)
Applicants	Unchanged	-15% to -25%
Admittees	-14.1%	-40% to -50%
Matriculants	-14.1%	-40% to -50%
Graduates	-8.1%	-35% to -45%
Passing the Bar	+7.9%	-30% to -40%

Source: For Sander’s estimates, *Systemic Analysis*, supra note ___, at 473, Table 8.2.

For our estimates: projections based on Bar Passage Study and 2004 LSAC admissions data

How did we and Sander arrive at such different numbers? As to applications, Sander assumes that, after affirmative action, all those who applied before would apply again (including those whose credentials were be so low that they would no longer have any hope of getting admitted anywhere). We believe that applications would decline both from those who recognize that with race-neutral criteria they will be accepted nowhere and from those who could still get in somewhere, but who, for the reasons we spell out in Part IIB, above, would decide that they do not want to go or cannot afford to go to the sorts of schools that would remain available.¹¹⁹ We estimate that the total decline in applications would be around

¹¹⁸ *Id.* at (draft pp. 19–20).

¹¹⁹ Ironically, it is conceivable that ending affirmative action could have the smallest effect on the number of applications by African American in the lowest index score ranges. In 2004, market signals did not stop 1,384 African Americans with 120-134 LSATs from applying to law school, even though only 15 (1%) were admitted.

15 to 25 percent.


As to admissions, Sander estimates a decline of 14.1%, entirely made up of those who, as calculated by Linda Wightman in 2001, had LSATs and UGPAs that, under the grid model, would not have allowed them admissions law school. To reach our estimate, we applied Wightman’s method to more recent 2004 admissions information and, as we report in Part IIA, found that, because of a large increase in white applicants, 32.5% of black students would not have been admitted anywhere in that year, even if they’d applied to a range of schools. Our ultimate estimate of a decline of 40 to 50 percent of admittees includes both the drop in admissible students and our earlier estimate of those who could still get in somewhere but would no longer chose to apply.

Sander’s remaining estimates are all affected by an error in his treatment of the 14.1% of students he assumed could not get into law school. Sander inappropriately estimated the proportion of black students who would graduate and pass the bar by removing *all* of the bottom 14.1% of African Americans by index scores from the 1991 sample and keeping *all* of those with higher index scores.¹²⁰ If he had followed Wightman’s model correctly, he would have taken into account that she had calculated that some applicants with very low indexes would still get in and some with higher indexes would have been excluded. Effectively, Sander inappropriately eliminated 366 black admitees with index scores under 500, and inappropriately retained 339 black admitees with 500-700 index scores and 27 with 700+ index scores.¹²¹ Applying all of Sander’s other methods, this one simplification on Sander’s part inflates the black 2001 post-affirmative action eventual bar pass rate (as a percentage of entering law students) by about 2.7 percentage points.

Underrepresented minorities from disadvantaged backgrounds tend to have less access to good information about higher education. Grace Kao & Marta Tienda, *Educational Aspirations of Minority Youth*, 106 AM. J. EDUC. 349 (1998). There are also cyclical barriers in the information market, including that many students have already sent in their applications before they receive their LSAT scores a month after the exam.

¹²⁰ *But see* Wightman, *Consequences of Race-Blindness*, *supra* note __, at 242 tbl.6. Within each of 90 LSAT/UGPA cells, Wightman’s grid model applies the white admission rate to the black applicants in the same cells.

¹²¹ Authors’ grid model calculations from LSAC, 2001 National Decision Profiles, *supra* note __, which produced a 14.3% decline in black admission offers. The chart below shows the way that Sander’s model took out of the hypothetical class too many of the students with low indexes and too few of those with high indexes. For both models in the chart, total black admittees = 3,159. Some index ranges are not shown (e.g., 460-480) because there were zero admittees in those bands under our method of calculating the midpoint index score for each of 90 cells.



At the stage of matriculation, both Sander and we assume, for purposes of comparison, that the rate of acceptances of offers would remain the same after affirmative action.¹²² Sander and we also both believe that a higher proportion of the African American students who did matriculate would go on to graduate and pass the bar, but our estimate of the improvement differs substantially from his. In our view, whatever improvement would occur would be nearly entirely a function of eliminating from law school most of the students with the very lowest LSATs and UGPAs, while Sander believes that the improvement would be partly a result of the elimination of those students and as much or more a function of the much better law school grades that African American students would earn when they began attending law schools where their entry credentials were the same as their white classmates.¹²³ In the end, because of eliminating the mismatch, Sander forecasts a net increase of 7.9% in the number of new lawyers who would enter the bar, while we, who regard the mismatch theory as unproven and unpromising, foresee a net decline in the range of 30 to 40 percent.

We believe that a 30 to 40 percent decline in the number of African American lawyers entering the bar each year would be intolerable.

III. The Impact of Ending Affirmative Action on the Distribution of African American Students among Law Schools.

We have just forecast that the numbers of African American students who would matriculate at law school each year would drop about 40 to 50 percent if affirmative action were ended. This huge drop would not be spread evenly across schools of all tiers. Even with his much more modest predicted decline of 14%, Sander recognizes that, if affirmative action were ended, the numbers of African American students at the nation's "most elite law schools,"¹²⁴ currently about 8% of their student bodies, would plummet to "the range of 1% to 2%."¹²⁵ At the same time, he implies that at schools other than the most elite, the numbers of African American students would change very little: the African American students who now attend the most elite schools would instead enroll at the next-most-elite schools; those who now attend the next-most-elite would attend the next group down the hierarchy; and so forth.

One of Sander's own tables strongly suggests that many more than just the most elite schools would experience a substantial decline. In Table 3.2, he reports that, in 1991, at the

¹²² Actually, we expect that there would be a slightly greater drop-off between acceptances and matriculation than there is now, but we had no way to forecast, among those who could have matriculated, how many would simply decide not to apply to law school at all and how many would apply and, after being admitted, decide not to matriculate. For this reason we built into the "application" line in the table our entire forecast of the decline we expected in matriculation among those who could still have received an offer of admission to law school.

¹²³ Even if accept Sander's method for comparing African American performance with and without affirmative action, when we use 2004 data we calculate a 21% decline in the number of black lawyers if affirmative action is discontinued. See *Infra* Section II.A.1. But since Sander has failed to prove the mismatch hypothesis, a more appropriate method for computing the decline is to apply black BPS pass rates (by index score range) to both current admitees and grid model admitees. This second approach, even though it does not incorporate our arguments about declining black applications and yield rates (which are difficult to model), shows a drop of ___% in African American attorneys without affirmative action for 2004.

¹²⁴ Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note ___, at 483.

¹²⁵ *Id.*

time of the Bar Passage Study, the median application index for African Americans in the 14 tier-one schools, which was 705, was 83 points lower than the median index score for whites in the tier-three schools (the mid-range public schools).¹²⁶ These 1991 data suggest that, without affirmative action, few black students at tier-one schools would have had the indexes needed to be assured of admission at tier-three schools, and many would have had scores that would make admission unlikely if race were not taken into account.¹²⁷ Since there are a total of 80 schools in the top three tiers, it follows that many African American students who were admitted in 1991 to a tier-one school might not have been admitted that year to any of the top 80 schools. This is true even though we have seen that the typical black student admitted to a tier-one school was an excellent bet to graduate and pass the bar.

Perhaps Sander's expectation that a substantial decline in African American students would occur at only the 14 tier-one schools grows out of his reliance on data from 2001, when by Wightman's calculations many more African Americans than in 1991 could have secured admission to at least one law school without affirmative action.¹²⁸ Between 1991 and 2001, the numbers of white applicants had declined substantially¹²⁹ and the gap between white and black entry credentials had narrowed somewhat.¹³⁰ Yet it remained true that, in comparison to those of other races, few African American applicants had the sort of entry credentials that would likely have assured them admission to any of the schools in the top three tiers in a completely race blind admissions system.¹³¹ By 2004, chances of admissions for African American students at the schools in the top three tiers would have diminished further, because of an enormous rise in 2002, 2003, and 2004 in the numbers of white applicants with high credentials.¹³²

It is extremely difficult to determine exactly how many law schools would experience severe declines in their numbers of African American students if affirmative action were ended, for many contingencies would be in play: the future numbers of white, black and other applicants; changes in admissions criteria applied by schools; changes in African Americans' admissions credentials; and so forth. What we can do, following the example of Linda Wightman, is to model the impact of ending affirmative action on law schools at different levels by assuming a race blind system in which law school admissions decisions are

¹²⁶ Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 416.

¹²⁷ At the tier three schools, the standard deviation for whites on the index was 73. *Id.* Thus, the median index for African Americans attending tier one schools was more than a standard deviation lower than the median index for whites at tier three schools.

¹²⁸ For 1991, ten years before, Wightman had forecast that about 52.5 percent of African Americans who matriculated that year could not have gotten into any American law school without the help of affirmative action. When she repeated the same analysis using 2001 data, Wightman, forecast that 14 percent of African American students would have found no law school that would take them. Wightman, *Consequences of Race-Blindness*, *supra* note __, at 243 tbl.7.

¹²⁹ See *infra* Table 1 and accompanying text.

¹³⁰ In the 1992 national admission pool, the mean black-white gap on the LSAT was 11.4 points (on a scale of 120-180, with a standard deviation of approximately 10). By 2003, the gap had narrowed to 10.7 points. Law School Admission Council, Average UGPA, Average LSAT, and Counts by Ethnic Groups – 1984-85 to Fall 2003 (2004).

¹³¹ Of the 15,421 applicants to law school in 2001 with LSAT scores of 160 or above (roughly the 83rd percentile), only 254 (or 1.6%) were African American.

¹³² In 2001 there were 77,235 applicants to law school, of whom 28,811 had LSATs of 155 or above. In 2004, there were 100,604 applicants to law school, of whom 38,134 had LSATs of 155 or above.

based only on LSAT scores and undergraduate grades.¹³³

Making this assumption, Wightman applied a logistic regression model to 2001 data and estimated that, without affirmative action, African American enrollment at the first-tier schools would decline by over four-fifths and at each of the next two tiers by approximately two-thirds.¹³⁴ While Wightman's approach may be criticized for both over- and under-estimating the probable impact of ending affirmative action at schools of different tiers,¹³⁵ we believe that in the case of the higher tier schools, it provides a plausible approximation of the likely impact that ending affirmative action would have on African American enrollments.

We made our own attempt to model the probable effects on black enrollment by tiers and while our model is even cruder than Wightman's, it produces similar results and we believe fairly illustrates the sorts of effects that ending affirmative action might have. Using 2003 admissions data and *U.S. News* rankings,¹³⁶ we divided law schools into groups. We then combined LSAT scores and UGPA into an index following Sander's formula and assumed that all the first-year places available at the top 10 schools would be filled by the students with the highest indexes, that all places at the 11th through 25th school would be filled with those with the next highest indices and so forth. Table 5, in Line B, presents the results of our model.

¹³³ The picture would be essentially the same if other factors influenced admissions but relative to LSAT scores and UGPAs they were of small moment and distributed randomly across applicants.

¹³⁴ Wightman, *The Consequences of Race-Blindness*, *supra* note , at 247 tbl.9.

¹³⁵ It overestimates declines because it estimates the probability of acceptance only for persons who actually applied to the very school. As Sander has pointed out, with the end of affirmative action, many African American candidates would apply to lower-tier schools to which they wouldn't have applied previously. On this ground, he calls the model "nonsensical" as a basis for predicting black enrollments. Sander, *Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action*, *supra* note 1, at 471, n.275. This criticism has force when Wightman's model is used to estimate the overall decline in black enrollment, but it has little force when applied to her estimates of declines in higher tier schools, because these are the students, who, if they applied at all, would still be admitted to law school at the schools in the lower tiers. In another sense, Wightman's methods in her tier-by-tier regression tend to understate the probable decline in African American students, especially at the second and third tier schools, because a person who applied and would have been accepted at a first-tier school was also counted in Wightman's regression as have been accepted in the second or third tier if the person also applied to a school in that tier.

¹³⁶ *Schools of Law*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 12, 2004, at 69. Admittedly, these rankings are controversial and warrant criticism. Richard O. Lempert, *Of Polls and Prestige: One Faculty Member's Candid Views*, 34 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 62, 68 (1990) (criticizing the *U.S. News* rankings). However, our options are limited because, for confidentiality reasons, none of the LSAC-BPS publications identify the law schools in the six clusters that Wightman devised.

**Table 5: African American Enrollments at U.S. Law Schools in 2003
if LSAT and UGPA were the sole criteria for selection**

	Range of Law Schools	Top 10	11 th -25 th	26 th -50 th	51 st -100 th	Group 3	Group 4
A	Estimated Number of African American students	23	44	99	292	263	574
B	Estimated % of Student Body who would be African American	0.75%	1.01%	1.68%	2.38%	3.72%	4.69%
C	Doubling B to account for factors other than LSATs and UGPA	1.50%	2.02%	3.36%	5.74%	7.44%	9.38%

Source: 2003 LSAC admissions data.

The results in Table 5, Line B, are low, unrealistically low, because not all students apply to the highest tier law school that will admit them and because no law schools simply admit all the highest scoring applicants. It is this attention to other factors, specifically applicants' race and ethnicity, that has characterized affirmative action, but even apart from their race many black applicants would have distinguishing life experiences or skills that would lead a school to want to enroll them. We don't know how many this would be, but let us assume line B is low by a factor of two, because black applicants were stronger than other applicants on other factors (or because applicants of other races with high indexes disproportionately chose to attend lower tier schools). Line C in the table doubles the percentages in Line B. Even with doubling, only 1.5% of the students at the top 10 schools, 2.0% of those at the next fifteen schools, and 3.4% of those at the next 25 schools would be African American. Taken together, at the top 50 schools, African Americans would, in 2003, have constituted only about 2.5% of the students, a number that is down by about two-thirds from their actual numbers and of the same order of magnitude as Wightman's estimated drop for schools below the very top.

Consider the implications of a decline of this scale. If African Americans constituted only 2.5% of the student bodies of these schools, rather than the roughly 8% that they are today, then a law school that had 80 students in each of four first-year sections would have, on average, only 2 African American student in each section after the end of affirmative action. This compares to the 6 or 7 African American students in each such section today.

With declines of this magnitude, three harmful consequences are likely to occur at the affected law schools. First, some very able African Americans who would not want to be part of a tiny racial minority would decide not to apply to any of these schools, further reducing their numbers of African American students.¹³⁷ Second, those few who did matriculate would be likely to feel conspicuous and isolated, to participate less in class, and otherwise to contribute less to the intellectual life around them.¹³⁸ And third, white students

¹³⁷ See discussion *infra* Part II.A.1.

¹³⁸ Patricia Gurin et al., *Diversity in Higher Education: Theory and Impact on Educational Outcomes*, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 330, 360 (2002) ("The worst consequence of the lack of diversity arises when a minority student is a token in a classroom. In such situations, the solo or token minority individual is often given undue attention, visibility, and distinctiveness, which can lead to greater stereotyping by majority group members."). A study including focus groups and surveys found underrepresented minority students encountered these sorts of

at these schools would lose the opportunity to learn from and interact with African American students.¹³⁹ We live in a multiracial society, but one that still endows race with great social significance.¹⁴⁰ Racial understanding comes in significant part from actual interaction.

Other, broader societal harms would also flow from cutting African American enrollments by over two-thirds at the most selective 50 or 80 law schools. As the majority opinion in *Grutter* recognized,¹⁴¹ the nation's top law schools produce a very high proportion of the leaders of the American bar, of elected and appointed officials, and of policymakers and opinion shapers in the country. Over the past 30 years, affirmative action has permitted thousands of African Americans to attend elite and near elite schools, which has helped open the doors needed to become part of the next generation of leaders.¹⁴² The impact of eliminating affirmative action at elite law schools would likely be severe in leadership positions in the profession. African American partners in corporate law firms,¹⁴³ professors teaching at law schools,¹⁴⁴ and federal judges all come disproportionately from the nation's most elite schools.¹⁴⁵ Of course, many white and minority leaders have also attended law schools farther down the U.S. News rankings, but the ranges of career opportunities are simply narrower at the less prestigious schools and it is harder to rise to positions of prominence.

problems at UC Berkeley after Prop. 209. Daniel Solorzano et al., *Keeping Race in Place: Microaggressions and Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley*, 23 CHICANO-LATINO LAW REVIEW 15 (2002).

¹³⁹ Cf. Mitchell J. Chang et al., *Cross-Racial Interaction Among Undergraduates: Some Consequences, Causes, and Patterns*, 45 RESEARCH IN HIGHER EDUC. 529, 545-45 (2004) (studying national longitudinal survey data, and concluding "Thus, even though the percentage of students of color has a positive effect on cross-racial interactions as a whole, this effect is accounted for most often through the experiences of white students...").

¹⁴⁰ MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., *WHITE-WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY* (2003); Cheryl I. Harris, *Critical Race Studies, An Introduction*, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2002).

¹⁴¹ 123 S.Ct. at 2341.

¹⁴² AM. BAR ASS'N COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITIES IN THE PROFESSION, *MILES TO GO 2000: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION* (2000); David B. Wilkins, *Rollin' on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox*, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 527, 535-36 (2000).

¹⁴³ David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, *Why are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms*, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 563-64 (1996).

¹⁴⁴ For example, of the 600 African American law professors in the latest *AALS Directory*, 48.1% graduated from the law schools ranked 1-10 in *U.S. News*, and 60.1% graduated from the law schools ranked 1-20. Authors' calculations based on data from the AALS 2003-04 DIRECTORY, n = 604. An additional 13.1% had other advanced degrees from elite schools (J.S.D. or LL.M. from Stanford, etc.), and analysis of African American professors at the top 75 law schools (n = 266) indicated that 74.4% graduated from the top 20 law schools. We are not arguing that all these professors directly benefited from an affirmative action plus factor, nor are we arguing that none would have become professors had they attended lower ranked schools in the absence of affirmative action. What is clear, however, is that law school prestige matters a great deal in the law teaching market. See also Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, *Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors*, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 227 tbl.27 (1991)(in study of 872 law professors, 60% graduated from the top 25 schools).

¹⁴⁵ African Americans were 10.7% of all active Article III federal judges last year. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ANNUAL REPORT 23 tbl.1A (2003) (12 of 167 appellate judges and 75 of 648 district court judges). Of the one hundred African American judges for whom we could obtain data, over 40% were graduates of the top twenty law schools. Compiled from AM. BAR ASS'N, THE DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (3rd ed., 2001) together with the online *Judicial Yellow Book*, by Aimee S. Mangan, Faculty Services Librarian, University of Michigan Law Library (Dec. 2004) (n = 104). Over 90% of these judges graduated from law school in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s.

It is at the most elite schools where the effects on the white and minority students of ending affirmative action would be most unambiguously harmful. As we saw earlier, the African Americans at Wightman's tier-one schools graduate and pass the bar at higher rates than African Americans with the same credentials at schools in the lower tiers.¹⁴⁶ Other evidence suggests that they earn higher incomes than the graduates of higher tiers.¹⁴⁷ They are quite unlikely to regard themselves as the victims of affirmative action. Thus ending affirmative action would offer no benefits to these students and cause a substantial loss both to them and to the white and other students remaining at these schools. Near the end of his article, Sander proposes, as an alternative to ending affirmative action altogether, that law schools "only use preferential admissions preferences for blacks to the extent necessary to prevent black enrollment from falling below 4% of total enrollment."¹⁴⁸ Whatever else may be said of this recommendation, it would produce harm at the most elite schools, because it would deprive roughly half of the African American students who attend these schools today of an education they have been putting to very good use.

Conclusion

In his conclusion, Sander claims that "the production of black lawyers would rise significantly in a world without affirmative action."¹⁴⁹ Sander is wrong. The evidence in this essay demonstrates just the opposite: that, without affirmative action, both the enrollment of black law students (particularly at the 50 or 80 most selective schools) and the production of black lawyers would significantly decline. We share Sander's dismay at the high rate at which African American students today fail to graduate from law school and fail to pass the bar, but ending affirmative action is not the solution.

¹⁴⁶ At these tier one schools, whites on the BPS graduated at higher levels than African Americans and passed the bar at slightly higher rates than African Americans, but Sander has been unable to prove that "mismatch" is the reason for the difference.

¹⁴⁷ *Infra* note ___ (Part IIA concerning AJD study and report of earnings and financial aid).

¹⁴⁸ Sander, *Systemic Analysis*, *supra* note , at 483.

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at 476.